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This was a year of great expectations in the field of higher education law, and it continues 
as such, with our expectations unfulfilled. There were some significant decisions issued shortly 
after the last Annual Conference.  In June of 2013, the U.S Supreme Court issued five decisions 
of importance to faculty members and institutions: in Fisher (infra at pg. 12), the Court 
reaffirmed the legal standard applicable to affirmative action in higher education admissions; in 
two employment law cases, Nassar and Vance, (infra at pg. 14-15) the Court addressed the 
standard of proof in retaliation cases and the issue of supervisory authority; and in Windsor and 
Hollingsworth, (infra at pg. 5-6) the Court addressed the issue of gay marriage.  Finally, there 
were a number of significant lower court decisions on issues including copyright law, First 
Amendment protections, FOIA requests and tenure contracts.   
However, many of the major issues in higher education employment law are pending 
before the courts and the National Labor Relations Board. Pending before the Board are cases 
addressing whether faculty members are employees who are covered by the National Labor 
Relations Act (and can therefore unionize) or whether they are managers excluded from 
coverage (Point Park University and Pacific Lutheran University, infra at pg. 20); whether 
scholarship football players are employees covered by the Act (Northwestern University, infra at 
pg. 22); and whether and when religiously affiliated institutions are subject to Board jurisdiction 
(Pacific Lutheran University, infra at pg. 19). The Board case addressing whether graduate 
student assistants are employees under the NLRA was resolved by the parties and therefore 
withdrawn. (NYU, infra at pg. 22).  In addition, the validity of a number of Board decisions are 
                                                 
1
This outline is an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of higher education cases of interest to this audience that have 
come out over approximately the past twelve months.  It is intended to provide general information, not binding 
legal guidance.  If you have a legal inquiry, you should consult an attorney in your state who can advise you on your 
specific situation. 
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in doubt while the Supreme Court considers whether President Obama’s recess appointments 
were constitutional. (Noel Canning, infra at pg. 18).  Further, the U.S. Supreme Court previously 
signaled that the current agency fee system may be subject to challenge (Knox, infra at pg. 24) 
and it may have taken up this challenge this year. (Harris infra at pg. 25.)  Similarly, other issues 
of importance to faculty are pending before the courts: issues related to copyright ownership of 
digital materials are pending before the second and eleventh circuits (HathiTrust and Cambridge 
University Press, infra at pg. 16-17); the protection of academic research from subpoenas is 
pending before the Virginia Supreme Court (ATI, infra pg. 6 ); and the issue of whether religious 
institutions are immune from suits to enforce university handbooks is pending before the 
Kentucky Supreme Court (Kant, infra at pg. 10). 
 
II. First Amendment and Speech Rights for Faculty and other Academic Professionals 
A. Speech Related to University Governance or Administrative Matters 
 
Demers v. Austin, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1811 (9th Cir. Wash. Jan. 29, 2014)(Important 
note, previous opinion dated September 4, 2013 and published at 729 F.3d 1011 was 
withdrawn and substituted with this opinion.)  
  
 Professor Demers became a faculty member at Washington State University (WSU) in 
1996 and he obtained tenure in 1999. Demers taught journalism and mass communications 
studies at the university in the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication.  Starting in 2008, 
Demers took issue with certain practices and policies of the School of Communication. Demers 
began to voice his criticism of the college and authored two publications entitled 7-Step Plan for 
Improving the Quality of the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication and The Ivory Tower 
of Babel.  Demers sued the university and claimed that the university retaliated against him by 
lowering his rating in his annual performance evaluations and subjected him to an unwarranted 
internal audit in response to his open criticisms of administration decisions and because of his 
publications. 
The district court dismissed Demers’ First Amendment claim, stating, primarily, that 
Demers made his comments in connection with his duties as a faculty member.  Unlike most 
recent cases involving free speech infringement at public universities, the district court’s analysis 
did not center on the language from Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Instead, the court 
applied a five part test set out by the Ninth Circuit in a series of public employee speech cases 
and found that Demers was not speaking as a private citizen on matters of public concern. 
Therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. 
 Demers appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The AAUP joined with the Thomas Jefferson 
Center for the Protection of Free Expression to file an amicus brief in support of Demers.  The 
amicus brief argued that academic speech was not governed by the Garcetti analysis, but instead 
was governed by the balance test established in  Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 US 563 
(1968).  The Ninth Circuit agreed and issued a ruling that vigorously affirmed that the First 
Amendment protects the academic speech of faculty members.   
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 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that “the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the 
importance of protecting academic freedom under the First Amendment.”  Thus, the Supreme 
Court recently explained, "We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public 
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university 
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition." Citing Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003). The Ninth Circuit also noted that in Garcetti the Supreme 
Court, concerned over the possible threat to academic freedom, reserved the question of whether 
the Garcetti analysis applied to speech related to scholarship or teaching.  
 Given the seminal importance of academic speech, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
Garcetti analysis did not apply to teaching and academic writing, even when undertaken 
"pursuant to the official duties" of a teacher and professor.  Instead, as argued in the amicus 
brief, the court held that academic employee speech was protected under the Pickering balancing 
test.  Applying this test, the court found that the speech was protected as it addressed a matter of 
public concern but that there were additional factual questions that required resolution. 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision in favor of the University and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. 
 Interestingly, on January 29, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued 
an opinion withdrawing and modifying its previous opinion in Demers v. Austin, 729 F.3d 1011 
(September 6, 2013). Originally, the court held that "teaching and writing on academic matters" 
by publicly-employed teachers could be protected by the First Amendment because they are 
governed by Pickering v. Board of Education, not by Garcetti v. Ceballos. In its 2014 
superseding opinion, the court defined the category of potentially protected speech as "speech 
related to scholarship or teaching." This description is arguably broader than the original 
phrasing and matches the language from the Supreme Court’s Garcetti decision. See Garcetti, 
547 U.S. at 425. The 2014 opinion also denied the University’s petition for a rehearing and the 
petition for a rehearing en banc.  
 
B. Extramural Speech  
 
C. Other Recent First Amendment Cases  
 
Golembiewski v. Logie, 516 Fed. Appx. 476 (6th Cir. May 27, 2013) (not recommended 
for publication), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 213 (2013), rehearing denied, 134 S. Ct. 816 
(2013) 
 
A state university employee's petition to rescind her university's employee attendance 
policy was an employee grievance concerning internal office policy. Thus, it was not a matter of 
public concern upon which the employee could base a claim that she was terminated in violation 
of her First Amendment right to free speech. This was true although the employee submitted her 
petition to a state employment board and the petition was union related. 
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Turkish Coalition of America, Inc. v. Bruininks, 678 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 2012) 
 
In February 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the 
University of Minnesota (the University) did not violate the First Amendment rights of the 
Turkish Coalition of America (the Turkish Coalition) by labeling its website “unreliable” for the 
purposes of student research.  Because the University did not block students’ access to the 
Turkish Coalition’s website, but instead only discouraged reliance on the website’s materials, the 
court ruled that the tenets of academic freedom precluded the Turkish Coalition’s First 
Amendment challenge. Noting an “absence of allegations that the challenged actions posed an 
obstacle to students’ access to the materials on the [Turkish Coalition’s] website or made those 
materials substantially unavailable at the university,” the court found that academic freedom  
protected the actions of the defendants. 
Palmer v. Penfield Central School District, 918 F. Supp. 2d 192 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) 
 
 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York found that an elementary 
school teacher’s complaint that her school district discriminates against African American 
students was not protected speech under the First Amendment. Noting that the teacher’s 
statements (i) were made during a mandatory grade-level meeting and (ii) were “related to a 
matter that was directly connected to, and arose out of, her duties as a teacher,” the court held 
that the teacher did not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern.  As a result, the teacher’s 
speech was not protected from discipline from the school district. 
Mpoy v. Fenty, 901 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2012) 
 
 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that a teacher’s e-mail to the 
Chancellor of the D.C. public school system, which criticized the “classroom facilities, supplies, 
teaching assistants, and test scores” at the teacher’s school, did not constitute protected speech 
under the First Amendment.  Questioning whether the academic freedom exception outlined in 
Garcetti is applicable outside of the higher education context, the court held that the exception 
“surely would not apply in a case involving speech that does not relate to either scholarship or 
material taught.”  Further, citing the “form and context” in which the teacher’s complaint was 
made, the court ruled that the teacher’s e-mail was speech by a public employee; thus, the 
teacher was not protected from discipline as the result of his e-mail. 
 
Garvin v. Detroit Board of Education, 2013 Mich. App. LEXIS 391 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2013) appeal denied  494 Mich. 883 (Mich. 2013) 
 
 A Michigan Court of Appeals held that a public school teacher’s speech, made in the 
form of a report of student sexual assault to Child Protective Services, was protected by the First 
Amendment.  Finding that (i) the speech involved a matter of public concern, (ii) the speech was 
not made by the teacher in her professional capacity, and (iii) “the societal interests advanced by 
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[the] speech outweighed the [school district’s] interests in operating efficiently and effectively,” 
the court held that the First Amendment protected the teacher from retaliation stemming from her 
speech. 
D. Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Gay Marriage 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) 
 
This case involved a challenge to the Defense of Marriage Act, a federal statute that 
defined marriage as only between a man and a woman. The statute limited federal benefits 
arising from marriage, such as the marriage benefits under the tax code, to such marriages. This 
limitation was in place even if gay couples were legally married in a given state.  The Court 
ruled 5 to 4, with Justice Kennedy authoring the opinion, that this law was unconstitutional 
because it violated the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The Court found that the 
statute unconstitutionally singled out for adverse treatment a class of persons even though the 
individual states had decided to protect and honor such marriages.  As the Court noted “DOMA 
instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, 
including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.” 
While this decision is an important one, the Court did not rule that gay persons had a right to be 
married, instead this is still a decision for individual state legislatures.  Here is the concluding 
section of the decision.  
The power the Constitution grants it also restrains. And though Congress has great 
authority to design laws to fit its own conception of sound national policy, it cannot deny 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
What has been explained to this point should more than suffice to establish that the 
principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons who 
are in a lawful same-sex marriage. This requires the Court to hold, as it now does, that 
DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the 
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.  
The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it 
the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. See 
Bolling, 347 U. S., at 499–500; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 217–
218 (1995). While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government the power to 
degrade or demean in the way this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and all 
the better understood and preserved. 
The class to which DOMA directs its restrictions and restraints are those persons who are 
joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the State. DOMA singles out a class of 
persons deemed by a State entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their own 
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liberty. It imposes a disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a status the State 
finds to be dignified and proper. DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all 
persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their 
marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others. The federal statute is invalid, for no 
legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those 
whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By 
seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less 
respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)  
 
This case involved a challenge to California Proposition 8, which had overturned a gay 
marriage statute and had outlawed gay marriage in the State of California.  There was a 
challenge brought to Proposition 8, and the US District Court found that Proposition 8 was 
unconstitutional.  Importantly, the State of California did not appeal the decision, instead an 
outside group pursued the appeal.  The Supreme Court ruled that the decision of the district court 
could not be challenged by this outside group. Therefore, the appellate courts had no jurisdiction 
to hear any appeals and the district court decision was final and binding.   
While this case has the political effect of legalizing gay marriage in California, the 
Court’s ruling was based on procedural grounds and the Court did not address the substance of 
whether Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.  This distinction is exemplified by the differences in 
the Justices who made up the majority in Hollingsworth versus the Justices who ruled in the 
DOMA case: in particular, Justices Roberts and Scalia joined the majority in Hollingsworth but 
not in the DOMA case while Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor dissented in Hollingsworth.  Thus 
while this case has important political implications, and may have a procedural impact on cases 
in general, it does not address the underlying issue of the constitutionality of gay marriage. 
III. FOIA/Subpoenas and Academic Freedom 
 
The American Tradition Institute and Honorable Delegate Robert Marshall v. Rector 
& Visitors of the University of Virginia & Michael Mann, Va. Cir. Case No.: CL-11-
3236 (Circuit Court, Prince William County) appeal granted No. 130934 (Va. 2013) 
 
In 2011, the American Tradition Institute served a FOIA request on the University of 
Virginia regarding Professor Mann’s climate research. This request mirrored the subpoena 
previously served on the University by Attorney General Cuccinelli. (We previously reported on 
the conclusion of the Cuccinelli v. UVA case which was decided by the Virginia Supreme Court.)    
The University supplied some records, but took the position that the majority of the records were 
not subject to public disclosures.  Thereafter, ATI petitioned to compel the production of these 
documents.  Professor Michael Mann sought to intervene, arguing that the emails in question 
were his and therefore he should have standing in any litigation relevant to any document 
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release. AAUP submitted a letter to the 31
st
 Judicial Circuit Court of Virginia in support of 
Mann’s intervention, and the court granted him standing.   
AAUP and the Union of Concerned Scientists subsequently filed a joint amicus brief on 
July 24, 2012, in support of UVA and Professor Mann and urged that “in evaluating disclosure 
under FOIA, the public’s right to know must be balanced against the significant risk of chilling 
academic freedom that FOIA requests may pose.” The brief also argued that enforcement of 
broad FOIA requests that seek correspondence with other academics, as ATI sought here, “will 
invariably chill intellectual debate among researchers and scientists.”  Also, exposing 
researchers’ “initial thoughts, suspicions, and hypotheses” to public scrutiny would “inhibit 
researchers from speaking freely with colleagues, with no discernible countervailing benefit.”  
The brief further argued that allowing FOIA requests “to burden a university with broad-ranging 
document demands based on questions concerning the scientific validity of a researcher’s work 
or on the potential that something might turn up would have the strong potential to ‘direct the 
content of university discourse toward or away from particular subjects or points of view,’ and 
will have a significant chilling effect on scientific and academic research and debate.” 
On April 2, 2013, the Virginia Circuit Court issued a written Order ruling that faculty 
email correspondence related to academic research constitutes a public record under Virginia’s 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) when the faculty members are government employees on 
government property using government facilities for government purposes.  The court held 
however, that all of the records sought by petitioners qualified for exclusion under the Virginia 
FOIA exemption for “data, records or information of a proprietary nature produced or collected 
by or for faculty of staff of public institutions of higher education….. in the conduct of or as a 
result of study or research on medical, scientific or scholarly issues, whether sponsored by the 
institution alone or in conjunction with a governmental body, where such data, records or 
information has not been publicly released, copyrighted or patented” or under the exemption for 
personnel records.  The court also ruled that purely personal email messages are not public 
records under the Virginia FOIA.  Although the court did not rely on the academic freedom and 
First Amendment issues argued by the parties, it noted that the research exception in the Virginia 
FOIA does arise from the concept of academic freedom and from the interest in protecting 
research.   
The Virginia Supreme Court granted a petition for review and oral arguments were heard 
on January 9, 2014. The AAUP, in partnership with the Union of Concerned Scientists, has filed 
a brief with the court supporting Professor Mann and UVA and arguing that granting access to 
the private materials would have a severe chilling effect on scientists and other scholars and 
researchers. While freedom of information laws are important tools for keeping public 
institutions accountable, the broad scope of the requests suggests that they are designed to harass 
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In re Dolours Price, 685 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) and U.K. v. Trustees of Boston College, 
718 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2013)  
 
Referred to collectively as the “Boston College Subpoena” case, this complex litigation 
involves two separate federal appellate court decisions involving subpoenas served on Boston 
College for oral-history materials held in its John J. Burns Library.  In the first decision, issued in 
2012, the court held that there was no absolute privilege against the disclosure of research 
material. However, in the second decision, issued in 2013, the court held that in order to compel 
disclosure, the lower courts needed to review the subpoenas and conduct a balancing test, 
weighing the First Amendment concerns involved in releasing the materials against the 
obligation to provide evidence in a criminal case.  
Between 2001 and 2006, scholars at Boston College recorded detailed interviews with 
former loyalist and republican paramilitary members who fought in Northern Ireland; this project 
is known formally as the Belfast Project.  In order to make the interviewees feel safe (which was 
necessary to get their cooperation), the researchers promised the interviewees anonymity until 
the interviewees’ death.  The first interviews from the archive were published in the book, Voices 
from the Grave, and featured in the documentary of the same name, in 2010. These interviews, 
with former IRA leader Brendan Hughes and former UVF member David Ervine, were made 
public upon the death of these interviewees as per their agreement with Boston College. 
(http://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/)  
The Boston College subpoenas were issued on behalf of the British government based on 
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), which allows signing members to assist each other 
in international criminal investigations without going through diplomatic channels. The Boston 
College subpoenas are part of a criminal investigation by United Kingdom authorities into the 
1972 abduction and death of Jean McConville, who was thought to have acted as an informer for 
the British authorities on the activities of republicans in Northern Ireland. 
Boston College asked the United States District Court to quash the subpoenas as to 
records pertaining to the other still living interviewees on the grounds that release of the 
information could threaten the safety of interviewees, the continuing peace process in Northern 
Ireland, and the future of oral history. Boston College also argued that this type of forced 
disclosure could have a detrimental impact on academic freedom. In addition, the principal 
interviewers in the project, Ed Moloney and Anthony MacIntyre, together filed a motion to 
intervene in the district court case to protect the confidentiality of past and future contributors to 
the Belfast Project.  In a December 2011 opinion, the District Court rejected both Boston 
College’s motion to quash the subpoenas and the motion by Moloney and MacIntyre to intervene 
in the case, but did grant Boston College’s request for an in camera review.  Moloney and 
MacIntyre then filed individual complaints, which the District Court dismissed.  
Moloney and MacIntyre appealed to the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals the dismissal 
of their individual complaints and asserted that the compelled disclosure of the interview 
violated the First Amendment. On July 6, 2012, the First Circuit court upheld the dismissal of 
Moloney and McIntyre’s individual lawsuit. In re Dolours Price, 685 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).  
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The court also analyzed Moloney/McIntyre’s First Amendment claim that compelling production 
of the records violated  their individual “constitutional right to freedom of speech, and in 
particular their right to impart historically important information for the benefit of the American 
public, without the threat of adverse government reaction.” Moloney/McIntyre asserted that 
production of the subpoenaed interviews is contrary to the confidentiality they promised the 
interviewees and they asserted an “academic research privilege” to be evaluated similarly as a 
reporter’s privilege.  The court noted, however, that the United States Supreme Court has 
distinguished between “academic freedom” cases (involving government attempts to influence 
the content of academic speech and direct efforts by government to determine who teaches) on 
the one hand, from, on the other hand, the question of privilege in the academic setting to protect 
confidential peer review materials. 
The court viewed this case as falling into the second category of cases, and as such, “is 
far attenuated from the academic freedom issue, and the claimed injury as to academic freedom 
is speculative.” The court relied heavily on the decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972), in which the Supreme Court rejected a general purpose reporter’s privilege for 
confidential sources and held that the “government’s strong interests in law enforcement 
precluded the creation of a special rule granting reporters a privilege which other citizens do not 
enjoy.” The First Circuit pointed out that in Branzburg the court discussed the situation of 
reporters who promised confidentiality as well as of informants who had committed crimes and 
those innocent informants who had information pertinent to the investigation of crimes and 
found that the interests in confidentiality of both kinds of informants does not give rise to a First 
Amendment interest in the reporters to whom they had given the information under a promise of 
confidentiality. Thus, the court reasoned, “if the reporters’ interests were insufficient in 
Branzburg, the academic researchers’ interests necessarily are insufficient here,” and therefore 
Moloney and McIntyre had no First Amendment basis to challenge the subpoenas.  The court 
remanded the case for a determination on whether the individual interviews needed to be 
released pursuant to the subpoena.  
In 2013, the First Circuit again addressed the matter to determine whether the District 
Court properly compelled the release of certain interviews. U.K. v. Trs. of Boston College, 718 
F.3d 13 (1st Cir. Mass. 2013). The court rejected the position of the United States that federal 
courts do not have discretion to review for relevance subpoenas issued pursuant to a treaty 
between the United States and the United Kingdom. The court declared that enforcement of 
subpoenas is an inherent judicial function which, by virtue of the doctrine of separation of 
powers, cannot be constitutionally divested from the courts of the United States. The court 
further applies a “direct relevance” standard to its review of the material sought by the subpoena 
and explained that a “balancing of First Amendment concerns vis-à-vis the concerns asserted in 
favor of the compelled disclosure of academic and journalistic information is the law.” Applying 
the balancing test the court ruled that the number of oral history interviews ordered to be 
produced by the District Court should be reduced from 85 to 11. 
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IV. Tenure, Due Process, and Breach of Contract 
A. Tenure – Breach of Contract 
Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2012), appeal docketed, No. 2012-SC-000502 (Ky. Aug. 24, 2012) 
 
 Dr. Laurence Kant is the plaintiff-movant in this matter.  Dr. Kant, who is of the Jewish 
faith, was an Associate Professor of the History of Religion at the Lexington Theological 
Seminary (LTS).  LTS is affiliated with the Disciples of Christ, a denomination of the Christian 
faith, and does not provide classes with a secular purpose.  Teaching at LTS in various capacities 
since 2000, LTS granted Dr. Kant tenure in March 2006.  However, LTS terminated Dr. Kant’s 
contract at the end of the spring 2009 semester, citing financial exigency as the impetus for its 
decision. 
 Following his termination in 2009, Dr. Kant filed a complaint against LTS, “alleging that 
LTS had breached his contractual right to tenured employment and breached the implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing.”  Dr. Kant’s complaint sought both compensatory and punitive 
damages from LTS.  Following a hearing on LTS’ motion to dismiss the case as an 
“ecclesiastical matter,” the district court sustained LTS’ motion and concluded that Dr. Kant was 
a “ministerial employee” due to the subject matter of his course load.  Concluding that the 
ministerial exception thus applied in the case, and “that the issues in the case also involved an 
ecclesiastical matter,” the district court ruled that it lacked the requisite subject matter 
jurisdiction over the controversy.  
 Dr. Kant appealed the district court’s decision to the Commonwealth of Kentucky Court 
of Appeals, arguing that both the “ecclesiastical matters rule” and the “ministerial exception” do 
not apply to this controversy.  Ultimately, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling 
that it had no subject matter jurisdiction in this case.  First, the court of appeals found that LTS’ 
“decision making as to who will teach its students . . . would be an inquiry into an ecclesiastical 
matter” and that such inquiries are prohibited—except for in rare circumstances—under the so-
called ecclesiastical matters rule.  Second, the court of appeals agreed that the ministerial 
exception barred Dr. Kant’s claims because his “primary duties involved teaching religious-
themed courses at a seminary . . . that prepared students for Christian ministry.”  Relying heavily 
on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), the court of appeals found that Dr. Kant’s proffered 
cause of action (based in contract law principles) did “not trump constitutional protections and 
freedoms of the church.” 
 Dr. Kant then petitioned to the Kentucky Supreme Court for a discretionary review of the 
Court of Appeals decision. On or about February 18, 2013, the Supreme Court granted Dr. 
Kant’s petition for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals determination.  The AAUP filed 
an amicus brief on behalf of Dr. Kant in April 2013.  The brief argued that the school was bound 
by the contract that it had voluntarily entered into.  Further, the issue at the heart of the case -- 
10
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whether LTS was permitted to eliminate tenure and terminate Dr. Kant due to a financial 
exigency -- is a narrowly tailored, non-religious question that will not require the Court to 
intrude on or analyze matters of church doctrine or governance.  The Court heard oral arguments 
on August 23, 2013.    
 
Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 689 F.3d 558 (6
th
 Cir. 2012)  
 
Tenured law professor Lynn Branham was terminated from Thomas M. Cooley School of 
Law (“Cooley”) and subsequently sued the law school in federal court on claims of violations of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act and Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract.  The federal district court 
granted Cooley’s motion for summary judgment on Branham’s first three claims, but allowed her 
breach of contract claim to proceed.   The district court went on to rule that Cooley had breached 
its employment contract with Branham because it failed to follow the specified procedures for 
dismissal and ordered Cooley to comply with that process.  To comply with the Court’s order, 
Cooley held a faculty conference to determine whether there was good cause to dismiss Branham 
from her position.  The faculty concurred with the decision to dismiss Branham, and the Board of 
Directors unanimously upheld the faculty’s decision.  The district court then ruled that Cooley 
had fulfilled its due process obligations under the employment contract and that the process 
complied with Michigan law.  The court then entered judgment against Branham.   
Branham subsequently appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
arguing, among other things, that the district court erred in concluding that the tenure granted 
under her contract does not afford her rights beyond the one year term specified in her 
employment contract. The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision, concluding that 
Branham’s employment contract did not create an obligation of continuous employment, but 
rather expressly limited its term to one year.  The Court reasoned that while Branham may have 
had tenure in the sense that she had academic freedom, she was due only the employment 
protection and process specified in her employment contract.  
Branham’s attorney subsequently filed a Petition for Rehearing en Banc on September 6, 
2012. AAUP filed a motion and amicus brief in support of Branham’s petition which was 
authored by AAUP Committee A member Matt Finkin. AAUP’s brief argued that the district 
court ignored the well-developed body of law in which the courts have uniformly emphasized 
that tenure accords a continuing appointment until dismissal for cause.  Additionally, the brief 
noted that the courts have stressed that in construing the content of academic tenure, attention 
has to be paid to the relationship of tenure to the protection of academic freedom. Thus,“it is 
permanence of appointment that protects academic freedom in a way that a sequence of annual 
contracts simply cannot.”   
The Sixth Circuit issued an order on October 3, 2012, denying Branham’s petition for 
rehearing. 
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Grimmett v. University of Alaska, 303 P. 3d 482 (Alaska 2013)  
 
This case involved the termination of two University employees, Yauna Taylor, an 
“Administrative Generalist,” and Calvin Grimmett, a police officer.  (While neither employee 
was a faculty member, this case is instructive as their terminations arose under the general 
Regents Policy and University Regulations.)   
Both employees were found to have their terms of “appointment and other terms of 
employment governed by the Board of Regents Policy, University Regulations, and applicable 
campus rules and procedures.”  The Regents Policy and University regulations provided that if 
an employee was not designated as an at will employee, then the employees could only be 
terminated “for cause.”  Another Regents Policy allowed the University to discontinue or not 
renew an existing employee through “nonretention.” The University terminated both employees 
pursuant to the “nonretention” clause, and also alternatively terminated Grimmett for cause.  The 
University did not provide Taylor with an opportunity to contest her termination at a hearing. 
The University did hold a hearing on Grimmett’s termination and found that the “nonretention” 
was substantively valid and that there was just cause for termination.  
The employees sued for violation of their due process rights and breach of contract.  The 
employees alleged that the University had attempted to use the nonretention provision to avoid 
demonstrating that they had been terminated for cause.  The lower court issued a decision in the 
employees’ favor and an appeal followed. On June 28, 2013, the Alaska Supreme Court issued a 
decision finding that the employees were entitled to due process prior to a performance-based 
dismissal, and the termination of the employees without a due process hearing was reversed and 
the employees were awarded back pay. The court found that the employees both held for-cause 
employment and that that the non-retention clause could not be used for a performance-based 
dismissal of the employee. Further, the context of the non-retention clause suggested that the 
non-retention functioned in a way similar to layoff and financial exigency. Therefore non-
retention, like those two procedures, was limited to reductions in force or similar non-
performance-related exigencies.  
 
V. Discrimination and Affirmative Action  
A. Affirmative Action in Admissions 
 
Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)  
 
In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court generally upheld the constitutionally of affirmative 
action plans as implemented under the Court’s previous decisions. The Court generally 
reaffirmed its prior holdings that found that diversity in educational institutions was a compelling 
state interest that could necessitate the use of an affirmative action program.  However, the Court 
returned the case to the appeals court finding that the lower court had applied the wrong standard 
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of proof in determining whether the affirmative action plan was necessary to attain the goal of 
diversity.  
The case arose out of the University of Texas’ admissions plan. The UT system had 
previously determined that diversity was essential to its educational mission. In an attempt to 
attain diversity, the UT system replaced an earlier admissions plan which had explicitly 
considered race with a “Personal Achievement Index” (PAI). The PAI is produced through a 
holistic review of applications intended to identify students whose achievements are not 
accurately reflected by their test scores and grades alone. The PAI includes an evaluation of 
required written essays and a “personal achievement score,” which is made up of factors such as 
socio-economic status, languages at home, and whether the student lives in a single-parent 
household. In addition, the state legislature and the university adopted a variety of other 
initiatives to increase diversity. 
The AAUP filed an amicus brief with the Fifth Circuit in support of the UT system.  
Specifically, the brief focused on the benefits of a diverse student body and pointed out that the 
University of Texas specifically modeled its admissions policy on a similar policy endorsed by 
the Supreme Court. The brief also argued that academic freedom depends on the right of 
universities to freely choose who is admitted to their communities because universities have the 
educational expertise to design and fulfill their own academic missions. 
Relying on the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003), the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the university, affirming that the university has “a 
compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits of diversity.” In doing so, the Fifth 
Circuit also held that deference should be granted to the university’s educational judgment that 
diversity is essential to its educational mission, and that deference should be granted to the 
university’s decision to use race as a factor to attain this diversity.  
 The case was appealed to the Supreme Court.  In August 2012, the AAUP again joined in 
a coalition amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court and drafted by the American Council on 
Education. On June 24, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled 7 to 1 to remand the case because the 
lower court did not apply to proper standard of proof when evaluating the claims. In particular, 
the Court found that the Fifth Circuit erred in granting deference to the University’s decision to 
use race as a factor to attain diversity. As the Court explained, the “University must prove that 
the means chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal. On this 
point, the University receives no deference.” Slip op. at 10.  
However, most importantly, the Court did NOT rule that affirmative action was 
inherently unconstitutional, as many had feared.  Instead, the Court primarily reaffirmed its 2003 
holding in Grutter, which has been the law of the land for the last 10 years.  The Court also 
reaffirmed some of the fundamental holdings of Grutter. For example, the Court reiterated that 
“student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university 
admissions.” Slip op. at 7 (Quoting Grutter at 325.)  Similarly, the Court found that it was 
appropriate to accord universities deference on whether “such diversity is essential to its 
educational mission.”  Slip op. at 9.   
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While this decision does not change the legal standard, it may embolden those 
challenging these policies or may prompt reconsideration of their use by some higher education 
institutions. Thus the decision may provide political fodder to some, but it should not 
significantly alter the legal standards applicable in affirmative action cases.   
 
B. “Mixed Motive” Instructions and Discrimination Statutes 
 
Nassar v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013)  
In this case, the Supreme Court limited the standard of proof in retaliation cases to the 
narrower “but for” causation standard. 
 Naiel Nassar, M.D. served as an Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine and Associate 
Medical Director with the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW) Clinic. Dr. 
Nassar complained that he allegedly was being harassed by a supervisor, Dr. Levine, and sought 
transfer to another role that would take him out of her line of supervision. He stepped down from 
his faculty post when he received a job offer working for Parkland, an affiliated clinic, effective 
July 10, 2006. On July 3, he submitted a letter of resignation in which he asserted that his 
"primary reason" for resigning was because of Dr. Levine's harassing and discriminatory 
behavior. Shortly thereafter, Parkland withdrew its job offer.  
 Dr. Nassar brought suit in federal court, accusing UTSW of orchestrating Parkland's 
refusal to hire him in retaliation for his discrimination complaints, in violation of Title VII. The 
jury found that UTSW constructively discharged and retaliated against Dr. Nassar, and awarded 
him $ 3.4 million in back pay and compensatory damages. UTSW appealed to a three-judge 
panel of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing among other things that Dr. 
Nassar failed to prove that retaliation was the “but for” cause of Parkland's decision not to hire 
him. Citing to its 2010 ruling in Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010), which held 
that the mixed-motive framework is available to Title VII retaliation plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit 
court panel, without further analysis, affirmed the district court's judgment regarding liability for 
retaliation. UTSW appealed to the Supreme Court.     
The Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard of proof in retaliation cases was the 
narrower “but for” causation standard.  On June 24, 2013 the Court ruled 5 to 4 to vacate the 
decision of the Fifth Circuit finding it was appropriate to use “but for” causation, and not mixed 
motive causation, in Title VII retaliation cases. This ruling benefits employers and was contrary 
to the position argued by the AAUP in an amicus brief.  The American Council on Education 
(ACE) filed an amicus brief in support of UTSW arguing that AAUP policies supported the 
higher burden of proof.  The AAUP filed an amicus brief in response, arguing that ACE had 
misinterpreted AAUP policies and that in fact AAUP policies supported the “but for” standard in 
retaliation cases. The Court did not reach the issue of whether there a different standard should 
be applied to faculty members based on AAUP policies. That said, it is a relatively modest 
change in the burden of proof in such cases. In addition, the Court did not take the invitation 
from some amicus briefs to find that all similarly worded statutes would be interpreted in the 
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same fashion.  Such a ruling would have constituted a major change for legal claims under other 
statutes, such as the NLRA or the FLSA.  
 
C. Supervisor Liability Under Title VII 
 
Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013)  
 
In Vance v. Ball State, the Supreme Court addressed a claim of harassment brought by a 
cafeteria worker against another employee. The issue in Vance was whether the employee 
engaging in the harassment was a supervisor or a co-worker. Generally, an employer is 
accountable under Title VII when one of its supervisors harasses an employee.  However, if the 
harasser was only a co-worker, the employer would be liable only if it was negligent in failing to 
prevent the harassment.   
The case began when Maetta Vance, an African-American woman, sued her employer, 
Ball State University (BSU) alleging that a fellow employee, Saundra Davis, created a racially 
hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. During the time in question, Vance was 
employed as a catering assistant in the University Banquet and Catering division and Davis, a 
white woman, was employed as a catering specialist. The parties vigorously disputed the precise 
nature and scope of Davis' duties, but they agreed that Davis did not have the power to hire, fire, 
demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance. Vance's workplace strife persisted despite BSU's 
attempts to address the problem. As a result, Vance filed suit claiming that Davis was her 
supervisor and that BSU was liable for Davis' creation of a racially hostile work environment in 
violation of Title VII. 
The district court ruled against Vance explaining that BSU could not be held vicariously 
liable for Davis' alleged racial harassment because Davis could not "'hire, fire, demote, promote, 
transfer, or discipline'" Vance and, as a result, was not Vance's supervisor. The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed. 646 F.3d 461. It explained that, under its settled precedent, supervisor status requires 
"'the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee.'" Id., at 470. The 
court concluded that Davis was not Vance's supervisor and thus that Vance could not recover 
from BSU unless she could prove negligence. Finding that BSU was not negligent with respect 
to Davis' conduct, the court affirmed.  
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court decisions. In so doing, the Court adopted a 
relatively narrow definition of supervisor, finding that that because the alleged harasser did not 
have the power to make certain formal employment decisions, such as hiring, firing, or 
promoting, she was not a “supervisor” under Title VII, even though she did direct Ms. Vance’s 
day-to-day activities. Notably the Court’s narrow definition does not apply when there is a 
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VI. Intellectual Property  
A. Patent and Copyright Cases 
Cambridge University Press v. Becker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123154 (N.D. Ga. 2012), 
appeal docketed, No. 12-14676 (11th Cir. Sept. 12, 2012) 
 
This case arose when professors at Georgia State University (GSU) engaged in the 
copying and distribution of excerpts of copyrighted academic works through GSU’s course 
management system for use in their courses.  In April 2008, Cambridge University Press, Oxford 
University Press, and Sage Publishers (the Publishers) filed a copyright infringement action 
challenging these uses. Among the affirmative defenses that GSU asserted in their Answer was 
that any copying of the material was a fair use.   
During the course of the case, more than twenty professors were accused of infringement 
and deposed to justify their use of electronic reserves.  In September 2010, the court directed that 
the Publishers prove “a sufficient number of instances of infringement of Plaintiffs’ copyrights to 
show such ongoing and continuous misuse.” In May 2012, the district court issued a 350-page 
decision. It found only 74 claimed uses from 64 of Plaintiffs’ works even potentially infringing, 
and applied its conception of fair-use principles to these claims. The district court held that 
nearly all of the uses in question were fair use, and non-infringing, as GSU faculty used modest 
amounts of the texts in question for non-profit educational purposes. Ultimately the court found 
that the Publisher’s had proven only five infringements and even these were “caused” by the 
2009 Policy’s failure to limit copying to “decidedly small excerpts” (as defined by the court); to 
prohibit the use of multiple chapters from the same book; or to “provide sufficient guidance in 
determining the ‘actual or potential effect on the market or the value for the copyrighted work.’”  
  In August 2012, the court issued an order providing for declaratory and injunctive relief, 
essentially limited to ordering GSU to “maintain copyright policies for Georgia State University 
which are not inconsistent” with the court’s previous orders.  The court also held that the GSU 
was the “prevailing party” under 17 U.S.C. § 505 because they “prevailed on all but five of the 
99 copyright claims which were at issue” when the trial began.  This conclusion led the court to 
find that GSU were entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs because the Publishers’ 
“failure to narrow their individual infringement claims significantly increased the cost of 
defending the suit.” In September 2012, the district court awarded the GSU $2,861,348.71 in 
attorneys’ fees and $85,746.39 in costs and entered a final judgment that also incorporated its 
prior rulings on the merits.  
The Publishers filed an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In April 2013, 
the AAUP submitted an amicus brief in support of GSU. The AAUP urged the Court to affirm 
the district court’s judgment, but also to clarify that district courts assessing fair use claims may 
alternatively conduct a transformative use analysis to determine whether the use was fair.  A 
transformative use analysis compares the purpose for which the professors use copyrighted 
material in their teaching with the original purpose for which the work was intended.  The brief 
explained that in cases where the materials encompass more than a modest excerpt, the use may 
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nonetheless be transformative, and the failure to consider whether the use was transformative 
would burden or restrict countless highly expressive uses that have long been an essential 
teaching tool.  No decision has yet been issued by the Eleventh Circuit.  
  
Author’s Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), appeal 
docketed (2
nd
 Cir. Nov. 14, 2012) 
 
 In October 2012, the U.S. district court for the Southern District of New York ruled that 
various universities (collectively referred to as “HathiTrust”) did not violate the Copyright Act of 
1976 when they digitally reproduced books, owned by the universities’ respective libraries, for 
the purpose of aiding print-disabled students.   
 HathiTrust, a collection of universities including the University of Michigan, the 
University of California, the University of Wisconsin, Indiana University, and Cornell 
University, has agreements with Google, Inc. that permits “Google to create digital copies of 
works in the Universities’ libraries in exchange for which Google provides digital copies to 
[HathiTrust].”  HathiTrust stores the digital copies of the works in the HathiTrust Digital Library 
(HDL), which is used by its member institutions in three ways: for “(1) full-text searches; (2) 
preservation; and (3) access for people with certified print disabilities.”  (There is no indication 
from the court’s opinion that digital copies in the HDL are used outside of the library setting for 
purposes other than those enumerated.) The full-text search function allows users to conduct 
term-based searches across all the works in the HDL; however, where works are not in the public 
domain or have not been authorized for use by the copyright owner, the term-based search only 
indicates the page number on which the term appears.  Digital preservation of the works in the 
HDL helps member universities “preserve their collections in the face of normal deterioration 
during circulation, natural disasters, or other catastrophes.”   Finally, the function providing 
access to print-disabled individuals, or individuals with visual disabilities, allows disabled 
“students to navigate [materials] . . . just as a sighted person would.” 
 The plaintiffs asserted that HathiTrust’s digital reproduction of the universities’ works 
constituted copyright infringement.  The U.S. district court for the Southern District of New 
York, however, disagreed with this assertion.  While acknowledging that the plaintiffs had 
established a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the court found that HathiTrust 
successfully defended its right to use the works under the fair use exception outlined in the 
Copyright Act.  Weighing four factors relevant to evaluating a claim of fair use—namely, (i) the 
purpose and character of the use of the works, (ii) the nature of the copyrighted works, (iii) the 
amount of the work copied, and (iv) the impact on the market for or value of the works—the 
court held that the uses of the works in the HDL constituted fair use and, thus, did not constitute 
copyright infringement.  The court weighed heavily the fact that the digital reproduction of the 
works was for educational purposes, noting that “[w]here the purpose of the use is for 
scholarship and research . . . [the evaluation] ‘tilts in the defendant’s favor.’”  Further, the court 
acknowledged that a subset of the HDL’s collection—“previously published non-dramatic 
literary works”—were specifically protected by the Chafee Amendment to the Copyright Act.  
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The Chafee Amendment, when read in conjunction with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
requires educational institutions to make such works available in special formats for persons with 
disabilities. 
 The Authors have appealed and the case is now pending before the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals.  Oral argument was heard by the court on October 30, 2013.  
VII. Collective Bargaining Cases and Issues 
A. NLRB Authority  
 
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 
(U.S. June 7, 2013)   
 
 This important case involves the authority of the President to make recess appointments 
to the NLRB and the validity of decisions made by the Board, while such recess appointees were 
on the Board. To render decisions, the NLRB must have a quorum of at least three Board 
members.  On January 4, 2012, following the expiration of a Board member’s term the previous 
day, President Obama appointed three new Board members to the NLRB to ensure that the Board 
could reach this requisite quorum and, in effect, avoid a shutdown of the NLRB.  The President 
appointed Board members Block, Griffin, and Flynn using the Recess Appointments Clause of 
the Constitution. 
 In this particular case, Noel Canning, a Pepsi-Cola bottler and distributor from 
Washington state, appealed an adverse NLRB decision, dated February 8, 2012, to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.  Arguing that President Obama’s 
appointment of members Block, Griffin, and Flynn was unconstitutional, Noel Canning 
contended that the NLRB’s decision in its case was invalid because the Board lacked the quorum 
required to render a decision.  The circuit court agreed and ultimately ruled President Obama’s 
recess appointments invalid, vacating the NLRB’s decision.  To reach this conclusion, the circuit 
court closely scrutinized the meaning of the phrase “the Recess” in the Recess Appointments 
Clause of the Constitution and relied heavily on “logic and language . . . [and] also constitutional 
history” to decipher the term.  Concluding that “the Recess” refers only to recesses between 
sessions of the Senate—periods “when the Senate simply cannot provide advice and consent”—
rather than mere intrasession breaks, the court ruled that President Obama impermissibly utilized 
the Recess Appointments Clause to appoint members Block, Griffin, and Flynn. Because it ruled 
President Obama’s appointments invalid, the court vacated the NLRB’s decision in this case. 
In January 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found 
invalid three recess appointments that President Obama made to the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) early the previous year. As the recess appointments were “invalid from their 
inception,” the court found that the NLRB lacked the requisite quorum to issue a decision in this 
case and vacated the NLRB’s decision. This decision threw all NLRB rulings issued after 
President Obama’s January 2012 appointment of members Block, Griffin, and Flynn (over 200 
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decision in total) into question. However, despite the circuit court’s decision, the NLRB has 
continued business as usual.   
 In June of 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert to consider: (1) Whether the 
President’s recess-appointment power may be exercised during a recess that occurs within a 
session of the Senate, or is instead limited to recesses that occur between enumerated sessions of 
the Senate; (2) Whether the President’s recess-appointment power may be exercised to fill 
vacancies that exist during a recess, or is instead limited to vacancies that first arose during that 
recess.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, NLRB v. Noel Canning, 2013 WL 1771081 (No. 12-
1281). In granting the petition, the Supreme Court further directed that “in addition to the 
questions presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following 
question: Whether the President's recess-appointment power may be exercised when the Senate 
is convening every three days in pro forma sessions.” Writ of certiorari granted NLRB v. 
Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861, (U.S. 2013). Oral argument was heard on January 13, 2014 and a 
decision is expected in June of 2014. 
 
Pacific Lutheran University v. Service Employees International Union, Local 925, 
N.L.R.B. Case No.: 19-RC-102521 
 
The pending Board case of Pacific Lutheran University raised two issues.  First, the 
appropriate standards under Yeshiva for determining whether faculty are managers and are 
therefore not employees covered by the Act. (This issue is discussed below.) Second, when self-
identified religiously affiliated institutions are exempt from NLRB jurisdiction. Pacific Lutheran 
University, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 90 (Feb. 10, 2014).   
The issue of whether, and when, religiously affiliated institutions should be subject to 
Board jurisdiction was addressed by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 
490 (1979).  As the Regional Director explained, in Catholic Bishop, the Supreme Court held 
that the Act must be construed to exclude church-operated schools, because to do otherwise "will 
necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-
administrators and its relationship to the school's religious mission." Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 
at 502. Such an inquiry by the Board would violate the First Amendment. Id. Although it 
invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Court nevertheless posited that Board  
assertion of jurisdiction over church-operated schools would "'give rise to entangling church-
state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses sought to avoid."' Id. (quoting Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).   
There are two predominant tests for determining the application of Catholic Bishops, the 
test used by the Board and the test used by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The Board now 
applies a "substantial religious character" test on a case-by-case basis to assess whether, under 
Catholic Bishop, exercise of the Board's jurisdiction presents a significant risk of infringing the 
First Amendment, Trustees of St. Joseph's College, 282 NLRB 65, 68 (1986). The Board 
considers all relevant aspects of the school's organization and function, including "the purpose of 
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the employer's operations, the role of unit employees in effectuating that purpose, and the 
potential effects if the Board exercised jurisdiction."  Univ. of Great Falls, 331 NLRB at 1664-
65. Important factors include the organization's mission statement, whether and to what degree 
curriculum requirements emphasize the associated faith, requirements that faculty teach or 
endorse the faith's doctrine, significant funding by the religious organization, governance by a 
religious organization or religious doctrine, and requirements for (or preference given to) 
administrators, faculty, or students who are members of the faith associated with the institution.  
Id. at 1664-65; Ecclesiastical Maintenance Services, 325 NLRB 629 (1998). 
On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit applies a three part bright line rule.  In particular, the 
D.C. Circuit’s University of Great Falls sets forth three-part test as a bright-line rule for 
determining whether the Board has jurisdiction "without delving into matters of religious 
doctrine or motive." University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1344-45 (D.C. Cir. 
2002); Carroll College, Inc. v. NLRB, 558 F.3d 568, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Under this test, a 
school is exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction if it: 
(1) holds itself out to students, faculty and the community as providing a religious 
educational environment;  
(2) is organized as a nonprofit; and  
(3) is affiliated with, or owned, operated, or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a 
recognized religious organization, or with an entity, membership of which is determined, 
at least in part, with reference to religion.  
Univ. of Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1344-1345. 
In Pacific Lutheran, the Regional Director found that under either test the University was 
subject to Board jurisdiction.  The University requested review which was granted by the Board.  
Moreover, the Board requested the submission of amicus briefs on the religious exemption issue, 
and posed two questions related to religiously affiliated educational institutions.  
1. What is the test the Board should apply under Catholic Bishop to determine whether 
self-identified “religiously affiliated educational institutions” are exempt from the 
Board’s jurisdiction? 
2. What factors should the Board consider in determining the appropriate standard for 
evaluating jurisdiction under Catholic Bishop? 
Thus, the Board may be considering issuing a substantial decision involving religiously affiliated 
colleges and universities. Amicus briefs in Pacific Lutheran are due no later than March 28, 










Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 9 [2014], Art. 42
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss9/42
 21 
B.  Faculty, Graduate Assistants and Players Coverage as Employees Entitled to 
Collective Bargaining Representation  
 
Point Park University v. Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh/Communication Workers of 
America Local 38061, AFL-CIO, CLC, N.L.R.B. Case No.: 06-RC-012276 (Private 
Institute Faculty Organizing)  
 
Pacific Lutheran University v. Service Employees International Union, Local 925, 
N.L.R.B. Case No.: 19-RC-102521 
 
In two different cases, Point Park and Pacific Lutheran, the Board invited briefs from 
interested parties on the questions regarding whether university faculty members seeking to be 
represented by a union are employees covered by the National Labor Relations Act or excluded 
as managers. The two invitations for briefs in the two cases raised similar questions regarding the 
managerial exclusion. Compare Pacific Lutheran University, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 90 (Feb. 10, 
2014) and Point Park University, 2012 NLRB LEXIS 292 (May 22, 2012).  The amicus briefs in 
Point Park were filed in July 2012 and the briefs in Pacific Lutheran are due no later than March 
28,204.  In both cases, faculty members petitioned for an election and voted in favor of 
representation by a union, and the university challenged the decision to hold the election, 
claiming that some or all of the faculty members were managers and therefore ineligible for 
union representation. 
In Point Park, AAUP submitted an amicus brief in July 2012, urging the NLRB to 
develop a legal definition of employee status “in a manner that accurately reflects employment 
relationships in universities and colleges and that respects the rights of college and university 
employees to exercise their rights to organize and engage in collective bargaining.”2  AAUP’s 
brief stressed the extent to which the erosion of faculty power that union advocates at Point Park 
have cited reflects broad trends. “The application of a corporate model of management has 
resulted in significant changes in university institutional structure and distribution of authority. 
There has been a major expansion of the administrative hierarchy, which exercises greater 
unilateral authority over academic affairs,” the brief states. AAUP also points out that: 
“This organizational structure stands in stark contrast to the Yeshiva majority’s 
description of the university as a collegial institution primarily driven by the internal decision-
making authority of its faculty. Further, university administrators increasingly are making 
decisions in response to external market concerns, rather than consulting with, relying on, or 
following faculty recommendations. Thus, university decision-making is increasingly made 
unilaterally by high-level administrators who are driven by external market factors in setting and 
                                                 
2
 Point Park University v. Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh/ Communication Workers of America Local 38061, AFL-
CIO, CLC, NLRB Case No.: 06-RC-012276,  Amicus Curiae Brief of American Association of University 
Professors  
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/CFE2A35C-44AC-4F87-975D-E405CF5D5209/0/PointParkamicus.pdf (last 
accessed 7/23/2012)  
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implementing policy on such issues as program development or discontinuance, student 
admissions, tuition hikes, and university-industry relationships. As a result, the faculty have 
experienced a continually shrinking scope of influence over academic matters.” 
 In addition to AAUP’s brief, amicus briefs were filed by Matthew Finkin, Joel Cutcher-
Gershenfeld, and Thomas A. Kochan (as impartial employment and labor relations scholars); Dr. 
Michael Hoerger, PhD, social scientist; Higher Education Council of the Employment Law 
Alliance; National Education Association; Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh, CWA, AFL-CIO, and 
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations;  American Council 
on Education, National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, Council of 
Independent Colleges, Association of Independent Colleges and Universities of Pennsylvania, 
College and University Professional Association for Human Resources, and Association of 
American Universities; The Center for the Analysis of Small Business Labor Policy, Inc.; Louis 
Benedict, MBA, J.D., Ph.D. (Higher Education Administrator); and National Right to Work 
Legal Defense and Education Foundation, Inc.
3
  Similar amicus briefs will likely be filed in 
Pacific Lutheran.  
 
New York University v. GSOC/UAW, N.L.R.B. Case No.: 02-RC-023481; Polytechnic 
Institute of New York University v. International Union, United Automobile Aerospace, 
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), N.L.R.B. Case No.: 29-RC-
012054 
 
In June 2012, the Board invited briefs from interested parties on the question of whether 
graduate student assistants may be statutory employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the 
National Labor Relations Act.  The Board specifically invited parties to address whether the 
Board should modify or overrule its decision in Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004), which 
held that graduate student assistants are not statutory employees because they “have a primarily 
educational, not economic, relationship with their university,” and whether, if the Board finds 
that graduate student assistants may be statutory employees, should the Board continue to find 
that graduate student assistants engaged in research funded by external grants are not statutory 
employees, in part because they do not perform a service for the university? See New York 
University, 332 NLRB 1205, 1209 fn. 10 (2000) (relying on Leland Stanford Junior University, 
214 NLRB 621 (1974).   
AAUP co-signed with the AFL-CIO, AFT, and NEA, on an amicus brief which was filed 
on July 23, 2012, and argued that the Board should overrule Brown University and return to its 
prior determination that graduate student assistants, who “‘must perform work, controlled by the 
Employer, and in exchange for consideration,’” are statutory employees, “‘notwithstanding that 
they are simultaneously enrolled as students.’” However, the union and NYU resolved their 
disputes and the union requested to withdraw the election petition.  Accordingly, on December 5, 
                                                 
3
 Point Park University v. Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh/ Communication Workers of America Local 38061, AFL-
CIO, CLC, NLRB Case No.: 06-RC-012276 http://www.nlrb.gov/case/06-RC-012276 (last accessed 7/23/2012) 
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2013, the Board held that the requests for review were moot and would not be ruled on by the 
Board.  Therefore, the issue of whether graduate student assistants are employees covered by the 
NLRA will need to wait for another day.  
 
Northwestern University and College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), Case No. 
13-RC-121359 (March 26, 2014) 
 
This important Regional Director decision addressed whether football players at 
Northwestern University were employees subject to the NLRA and therefore were entitled to 
choose whether to be represented by a union for collective bargaining purposes. The primary 
question was whether players were “employees” as defined by the law.  The Board applies the 
common law definition under which a person who performs services for another under a contract 
of hire, subject to the other’s control or right of control, and in return for payment, is an 
employee.   
The first question was whether the payers were receiving “payment” from the University.  
The Regional Director noted that the scholarships received by the players had a monetary value 
of as much $76,000 per year.  He explained, “While it is true that the players do not receive a 
paycheck in the traditional sense, they nevertheless receive a substantial economic benefit for 
playing football. And those players who elect to live off campus receive part of their scholarship 
in the form of a monthly stipend well over $1,000 that can be used to pay their living expenses.” 
Slip Op. at. 14. 
Of course, other students receiving scholarships also receive something of monetary 
value.  However, the Regional Director found that the players received this monetary value “in 
exchange for the athletic services being performed.”  He noted that the University recruited and 
granted scholarships to players because of their athletic prowess.  Moreover, while Northwestern 
did not utilize one year renewable scholarships, the players could still lose their scholarships if 
they withdrew from the team or violated team rules.  Finally, the provision of athletic services 
significantly benefited the University, generating revenue of approximately $235 million from 
2003 through 2012.  Thus the purpose of the football scholarship was to secure athletic services 
for the benefit of the University. (By contrast the Regional Director found that walk-ons, who 
did not receive an athletic scholarship, were not employees “for the fundamental reason that they 
do not receive compensation for the athletic services that they perform.”)   
Another important factor was that the Regional Director found that the players had an 
employment contract with the University: “the type of compensation that is provided to the 
players is set forth in a ‘tender’ that they are required to sign before the beginning of each period 
of the scholarship. This ‘tender’ serves as an employment contract and also gives the players 
detailed information concerning the duration and conditions under which the compensation will 
be provided to them.” The Regional Director also found that the players who received 
scholarships were under strict and exacting control by the University throughout the entire year.  
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Therefore, the Regional Director held that players receiving athletic scholarships were 
employees under the general common law definition of employee.  
The Regional Director further determined that the test applied to find that graduate 
assistants were not employees was inapplicable “because the players’ football-related duties are 
unrelated to their academic studies unlike the graduate assistants whose teaching and research 
duties were inextricably related to their graduate degree requirements.” Slip Op. at 18 citing 
Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004). 
Nonetheless, the Regional Director noted that even applying the four factors used in 
Brown would not change the outcome of the case.  First and perhaps most importantly he found 
that players were not “primarily students.” Slip Op. at 18. “The players spend 50 to 60 hours per 
week on their football duties during a one-month training camp prior to the start of the academic 
year and an additional 40 to 50 hours per week on those duties during the three or four month 
football season.  Not only is this more hours than many undisputed full-time employees work at 
their jobs, it is also many more hours than the players spend on their studies.” Id. 
Second, he found that unlike with graduate assistants teaching and research duties, the 
players athletic duties do not constitute a core element of their educational degree.  A third 
important factor was the lack of relationship between the athletes and any academic faculty as 
the players were supervised by non-academic coaches, rather than by academic faculty as with 
graduate assistances. Finally, the Regional Director found that the player scholarships were not 
financial aid as they were provided in exchange for athletic services.  
Accordingly, the Regional Director found that the scholarship football players were 
“employees” within the meaning of the Act and therefore are entitled to choose whether or not to 
be represented by a union for the purposes of collective-bargaining.  The parties have until April 
9, 2014 to file with the Board a Request for Review of the Decision. 
 
 
B. Agency Fee 
 
Knox v. SEIU Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012)  
 
 In June 2012, the Supreme Court held that public-sector unions, seeking to collect either 
a mid-year fee increase or a special assessment, are required to issue a fresh “Hudson notice” to 
nonmembers at the time of the fee request; further, the Court held that after such notice is given, 
unions can only collect funds from those nonmembers who affirmatively choose to pay the 
requested fees.  This decision reversed an earlier decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit and may have implications for all public-sector unions operating under “agency 
shop” arrangements, which permit a union to represent all employees (union members and 
nonmembers alike) in a unionized workplace and collect annual agency fees from the 
nonmembers to cover the cost of the union’s services. 
 At issue in this case was whether the Service Employees International Union Local 1000 
(SEIU Local 1000), the bargaining agent for California state employees, was required to provide 
24
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 9 [2014], Art. 42
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss9/42
 25 
a separate Hudson notice after it imposed a temporary, mid-year fee increase to be used for 
political purposes.  More specifically, SEIU Local 1000 levied a special assessment to mount 
campaigns to defeat two measures on a November 2005 ballot, but did not issue a second agency 
fee notice for the year.  Agency fee payers challenged the special assessment, arguing that it 
violated their First Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution because it seized their money 
for non-chargeable political expenses.  The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction against the union, but ruled that the union must give the agency fee payers 
a chance to ask for a refund on the special dues.  SEIU Local 1000 appealed the district court’s 
decision, and the Ninth Circuit overturned the lower court’s decision, holding that the union’s 
notice complied with the procedural requirements for agency fee notices set out in the seminal 
case Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson. 
 The Supreme Court ultimately overturned the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, however, and held 
that, “when a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union must 
provide a fresh Hudson notice and may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their 
affirmative consent.”  Contrasting the lower court’s holding, the Supreme Court found that the 
Hudson precedent is not dispositive in the current case, explaining that the Hudson requirements 
only concern a union’s “regular annual fees,” while the plaintiffs in the current case were 
objecting to “a special assessment or dues increase . . . levied to meet expenses that were not 
disclosed when the amount of the regular assessment was set.”  Because SEIU Local 1000’s 
special assessment was requested after the union established its annual fee, the union was 
obligated to send a new Hudson notice with the special assessment to ensure that nonmembers 
could make “informed choice[s]” about paying the additional fees.  Further, to “respect the limits 
of the First Amendment,” the Court stated that the fresh Hudson notice would only allow SEIU 
Local 1000 to collect the special assessment if the nonmembers “opt into the special fee.” 
 In dicta, Justice Alito indicated that the Court’s former decisions (such as Hudson), 
which authorize agency shops to collect union fees from nonmembers, may in fact violate 
nonmembers’ First Amendment rights by compelling nonmembers to fund speech with which 
they may disagree. Noting that the Court’s earlier cases have “tolerated” this potential 
impingement upon First Amendment rights, however, Justice Alito declined to render a decision 
on the overall constitutionality of agency shops.  Commentators, however, have reported that this 
language could signal “[C]ourt approval of a . . . union-weakening, so-called ‘right to work’ 
law.”   
Commentators have argued that this language “all but begs” opponents of organized labor 
to use the Court’s emerging First Amendment jurisprudence to challenge the validity of agency 
shops altogether.   
Harris v. Quinn, cert granted, Case No. 11-681 (U.S. Oct.1, 2013) 
 
 The question in this case is whether the Supreme Court will take up the challenge and 
radically alter the agency fee jurisprudence as it has existed for over 35 years.  
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 The case has a number of unique facts that would appear to make it an unlikely candidate 
for a significant change in constitutional law.  The case involves personal care workers 
reimbursed by Medicaid (via the State of Illinois), who claimed that the "fair share" provision of 
their collective bargaining agreement that requires them to pay a portion of union dues, which 
are not allocated for political purposes, violated the First Amendment. By compelling payment 
(whether a part of the union or not) to support collective bargaining, they argued that their 
speech was compelled through the union. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. 
 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit unanimously held, according to longstanding collective 
bargaining jurisprudence, that "[b]ecause the personal assistants are employees of the State of 
Illinois, at least in those respects relevant to collective bargaining, the union's collection and use 
of fair share fees is permitted by the Supreme Court's mandatory union fee jurisprudence."  This 
agency fee jurisprudence has existed largely undisturbed since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  In Abood, the Supreme Court held 
that a law compelling non-union public employees to pay union fees to an exclusive 
representative was constitutional.  The Court reasoned that compelling employees to pay such 
fees would facilitate "labor peace" by avoiding workplace disruptions caused by employee 
support for rival unions and prevent employees from free-riding.   
 However, this case may develop into a major test of the continuing validity of the Abood 
precedent.  The home-care workers, and a number of their supporters, have sought to turn the 
case into a vehicle for overruling that decision outright. While they suggested that the Court 
could find that the Abood decision does not control this case, they left little doubt that their 
primary goal was to scuttle that ruling.  
 The federal government, participated in the case and argued that the Abood ruling was 
correct, adding that overruling it “would require the Court not only to discard sixty years of 
precedent on the specific issue of agency fees, but also to distort and destabilize the established 
framework for evaluating claims that a condition of public employment violates the First 
Amendment.” In short, the government contended, the home-care providers have offered nothing 
to justify “so radically reshaping First Amendment law.” 
 Illinois officials similarly defended the 1977 ruling, and accused the home-care providers 
and their attorneys of seeking “to remove collective bargaining from the options available to the 
government employer — not only in the present circumstances but in all others — by asking this 
Court to overrule one of its cases and implicitly suggesting that it overrule others.” 
 Oral argument was held on January 21, 2014.  The argument was lively and precipitated a 
range of reactions, from those who felt it portended little change in the law to those who saw the 
groundwork for a major sea change.   
 There are a number of potential outcomes, from the relatively innocuous to an extreme 
reworking of the rights of unions in the public sector. On the innocuous side, the Court could 
obviously affirm the ruling of the seventh circuit and confirm the vitality of Abood, leaving the 
law much as it currently exists.  The Court could also issue a narrow ruling limited to the unique 
circumstances of the parties, for example by finding that these workers are really not employees 
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of the state, but of the patients who hire them, so the state would have no authority to try to draw 
them into unions, nor would there be a state interest in labor peace as was the case in Abood. 
 On the other hand, the Court could decide to overrule or severely limit Abood.  If Abood 
was overruled, the Court could hold that any agency fees are unconstitutional.  Alternatively, the 
Court could hold, as Harris suggested, that Abood should be limited to situations where the 
government demonstrates that exclusive union representation is necessary and is the least 
restrictive means to prevent a workplace disruption, which would severely limit the instances in 
which agency fee could be applied.  There is also a potential argument that some aspects of 
collective bargaining in the public sector themselves are unconstitutional impositions on the 
freedom of association, which could eviscerate public sector bargaining.  
 Another potential ruling is more technical and foreshadowed in Knox. Namely, the Court 
could hold that the current method for determining agency fees paid is unconstitutional.  For 
example, in Knox Justice Alito was extremely critical of the system in which the union charges 
non-members a fee equal to dues unless the non-member objects (opting out.)  Some have sought 
to continue this line of argument and claim that the individual should only be compelled to pay 
the agency fee percentage unless they affirmatively join the union (opting in).   
 Thus this case has the potential to radically rework well established constitutional law, as 
happened in Citizens United, but it could end up simply reaffirming the Court’s long held views, 
as happened in Fisher.  
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